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T wo parallel developments in world
affairs that dominated the latter years 
of the twentieth century, each of which
gained momentum with the disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union a decade and a
half ago, have continued into the new
era. In politics, many of what had been
one-party Communist states gave way 
to multiparty electoral democracies, in
most cases with signi½cantly expanded
political rights and civil liberties for
their citizens. Thirty years ago, only for-
ty countries were politically ‘free’ by
conventional Western standards; today
there are ninety.1At the same time, what
had been centrally planned and directed
‘command’ systems for organizing eco-
nomic activity and distributing the re-
sulting product made room for a sharply
increased role for private initiative, in-
cluding private ownership of assets and
accumulation of wealth. While neither
of these developments has been univer-
sal, traditional Communist societies
committed to both one-party political
systems and centrally planned econo-
mies have suddenly become a rare spe-
cies, limited to isolated sightings like
Cuba and North Korea.
Especially at the time of the Soviet col-
lapse, many observers in the West sim-
ply assumed that the rejection of Com-
munism reflected an eagerness to em-
brace both Western politics and Western
economics. Russia and most of the other
former Soviet republics quickly adopted
many aspects of Western modes in both
dimensions, as did the former Soviet
dependencies in Eastern Europe. But it
soon became apparent that imitation of
Western ways was not the sole, nor al-
ways even the primary, motivation. On
the positive side, the mere desire for in-
dependence, and on the negative, old-
fashioned nationalism, turned out to be
important drivers as well–sometimes,
as in the former Yugoslavia, with disas-
trous consequences.
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1  Data are from Freedom House, a private non-
pro½t research institute. The increase from
forty ‘free’ countries in 1975 to ninety in 2007
modestly overstates the extent of the change, 
in that the total number of countries rated in-
creased from 158 to 193 over these years.Moreover, Western-style economics
and Western-style politics do not always
go together. Russia, for example, has pri-
vatized large parts of what was once a
tightly controlled economy steered by
Gosplan under successive ½ve-year plans
adopted at the highest levels of the Sovi-
et state. And since 1991 Russia has con-
ducted several rounds of elections, for
the national duma as well as for the pres-
ident of the republic, that were substan-
tially open and genuinely contested. 
But President Putin’s government now
seems to be cementing its grip on pow-
er in many forms, and prospects for the
future of democracy in Russia remain
uncertain–especially since Putin’s re-
election in 2004.
China presents an even larger ques-
tion. Beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s
reforms in 1978, China has moved stead-
ily away from central planning toward
private economic initiative. Even within
the economy’s industrial sector, where
state-owned enterprises were once dom-
inant, the share of production still car-
ried out under direct state ownership or
control has shrunk to 42 percent. Most
citizens are now free to decide where to
work, whether to start a business, and
whom to hire. Private wealth accumula-
tion, including ownership of productive
assets as well as residential real estate, is
not just allowed but encouraged.
But at the national level the Chinese
government remains a one-party dicta-
torship; and there is little publicly ex-
pressed interest in multiparty politics,
broader freedom of expression, or oth-
er elements of Western-style democra-
cy. Whether a country with one-½fth of
the world’s population and (soon) the
world’s second-largest economy can sus-
tain the combination of market-oriented
economics and nondemocratic politics 
is one of the most signi½cant open ques-
tions in world affairs today.
Even within the Western world, how-
ever–where electoral democracy and a
market-oriented economy are mostly
taken for granted–parallel movement
does not automatically imply a causal
linkage. Do the two necessarily go to-
gether? And if so, what is the causal
mechanism?
Half a century ago, the open question
was whether central planning or a de-
centralized private market could better
deliver ef½cient production of goods 
and services, investment in new capital
resources, and gains over time in pro-
ductivity and therefore, ultimately, in 
a population’s standard of living. Rich-
ard Nixon’s famous ‘kitchen debate’
with Nikita Khrushchev, in 1959, attract-
ed so much interest at the time not just
on account of the surrounding theat-
rics but because the question about
which they were arguing was genuine-
ly under dispute. Americans’ memories
of the 1930s were still strong; Soviet liv-
ing standards were reportedly improv-
ing rapidly; and the Soviets had only
recently demonstrated their scienti½c
prowess by launching the Sputnik satel-
lite into orbit around the Earth. Later,
when Khrushchev said that the Soviet
Union would ‘bury’ the United States, 
he was not threatening nuclear war (as
many at the time misinterpreted him to
imply) but predicting that the Soviets,
with their superior economic system,
would eventually overwhelm the West
economically and therefore politically.
Khrushchev was wrong. And as more
and more people living under Commu-
nism came to realize the error of that
prediction, change ensued in fairly short
order. Mao’s China gave way to Deng’s
not as a matter of ideological preference
–quite the contrary–but because Chi-
nese citizens did not want to live in pov-
erty forever and China’s rulers feared the
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consequences of forcing them to do so.
Similarly, a key trigger of the demise of
the Soviet Union and its empire was that
enough people there and in Eastern Eu-
rope–importantly including practical-
ly all of the nomenklatura–eventually
understood that, notwithstanding the
of½cial propaganda, they were falling
ever farther behind Western living 
standards. In 1990 the average Soviet 
living standard was only one-third that
of the United States, even after allow-
ing for differences in the cost of living.
The comparable ratio for Poland ver-
sus (West) Germany was one-eighth.
Perhaps ironically, an even more dra-
matic demonstration of the superior ef-
fectiveness of market-oriented econom-
ic systems is Korea. At the time of its
partition, at the end of World War II,
what became South Korea was the poor-
er, more agricultural part of the Korean
peninsula; most of the industry was in
the north. Incomes and living standards
were meager to negligible by Western
standards. Today the South Korean stan-
dard of living is more than half that of
the United States, modestly ahead of
Portugal’s, and more than twice Rus-
sia’s. South Koreans enjoy levels of life
expectancy, nutrition, and literacy com-
parable to Americans’ (and the South
Korean child mortality rate is lower).
North Korea, by contrast, remains a
desperately poor country where people
regularly starve in signi½cant numbers,
malnutrition is widespread, and those
who can manage to do so sneak across
the border into China in search of either
handouts or surreptitious work at sub-
sistence wages. Whether these contrasts
will eventually arrest the attention of the
North Korean public, and the country’s
political leadership, in a way comparable
to what happened in China, the Soviet
Union, and Eastern Europe is an inter-
esting subject for speculation.
But the important fact remains that,
ever since the Industrial Revolution, de-
centralized market economies have had
a proven record of delivering rising liv-
ing standards over sustained periods of
time. Asking whether a market economy
and democracy go together is therefore
tantamount to asking whether economic
growth and democracy go together. And
thinking of the matter in that way sug-
gests a mechanism by which the connec-
tion between the two might indeed be
causal.
T he experience of many countries sug-
gests that when a society experiences 
rising standards of living, broadly dis-
tributed across the population at large, 
it is also likely to make progress along 
a variety of dimensions that are either
part of the very de½nition of democracy
or closely associated with democracy.
These include not just open, contested
elections to determine who controls the
levers of political power but also politi-
cal rights and civil liberties more gener-
ally; openness of opportunity for eco-
nomic and social advancement; toler-
ance toward recognizably distinct ra-
cial, religious, or ethnic groups within
the society, including immigrants if 
the country regularly receives in-migra-
tion; and a sense of fairness in the pro-
vision made for those in the society who,
whether on account of limited opportu-
nities, lesser human endowments, or
even just poor luck in the labor market,
fall too far below the prevailing public
standard of material well-being.
Conversely, experience also suggests
that when a society is either stagnating
economically or, worse yet, suffering a
pervasive decline in living standards, 
it is not only likely to make little if any
progress in these social, political, and 
(in the eighteenth-century sense) mor-
al dimensions, but all too often it willundergo a period of rigidi½cation and
retrenchment, sometimes with cata-
strophic consequences.
The key to why so many societies be-
have in this way is that most people eval-
uate their living standards not in abso-
lute but relative terms. Further, sub-
stantial evidence points to two distinct
benchmarks by which people judge 
how well off they are: Most people are
pleased when they are able to live better
than they, or their families, have lived in
the past. And they are pleased when they
are able to live better than their friends,
neighbors, coworkers, and others with
whom they compare themselves.
The pervasive tendency for people 
to evaluate their economic situation 
by these relative, rather than absolute,
benchmarks explains a variety of eco-
nomic and psychological behaviors that
otherwise would be puzzling. For exam-
ple, within any one country, at any giv-
en time, people with higher incomes are
systematically happier than those with
lower incomes, but there is no corre-
sponding increase over time in how hap-
py people are on average even though
average incomes may be steadily increas-
ing. As Adam Smith observed long ago,
“All men, sooner or later, accommodate
themselves to whatever becomes their
permanent situation,” so that “between
one permanent situation and another
there [is], with regard to real happiness,
no essential difference.” Smith went on,
“In every permanent situation, where
there is no expectation of change, the
mind of every man. . . returns to its nat-
ural state of tranquillity. In prosperity,
after a certain time, it falls back to that
state; in adversity, after a certain time, 
it rises up to it.”2
But this propensity toward a relative
rather than an absolute perspective can
also explain why market economies, as
long as they deliver rising living stan-
dards to most of a society’s population,
lead more often than not to democracy
and many of the other features of a dem-
ocratic society. If people derive satisfac-
tion bothfrom living better than they
have in the past andfrom living better
than people around them–and, impor-
tantly, if these two sources of satisfac-
tion are at least partially substitutes for
one another–then when people are in
fact living better than they have in the
past (and have con½dence that their liv-
ing standard will continue to improve in
the future) they will attach less urgency
to the desire also to live better than oth-
ers around them. Hence the economical-
ly self-protective instinct that underlies
so much of what emerges as intolerant,
antidemocratic, and ungenerous behav-
ior–racial and religious discrimination,
antipathy toward immigrants, lack of
generosity toward the poor–naturally
takes a back seat to other priorities when
the economy is delivering sustained
growth with broadly distributed increas-
es in living standards.
A salient implication of this key role
played by rising living standards (as
opposed to merely a country’s average
income level) is that many countries
throughout the developing world prob-
ably will not have to wait until they
reach Western levels of per-capita in-
come before they begin to liberalize so-
cially and democratize politically. Here
again, South Korea is an instructive ex-
ample. Over roughly a quarter century,
beginning within a decade of the con-
clusion of the Korean War, South Korea
achieved a remarkable record of eco-
nomic growth that took the country’s
per-capita income from an extremely
low level to better than what one-fourth
2  Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 149.
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of Americans then enjoyed and better
than what one-third of the richer coun-
tries in Western Europe had. And, over 
a similar period, but following some-
what behind, South Korea evolved from
a one-party military dictatorship under
Syngman Rhee and his successors into 
a reasonably well-functioning electoral
democracy, with most of the usual dem-
ocratic freedoms.
Over the past quarter century China
has maintained the fastest advance in
per-capita income observed anywhere 
in the world: on average, 7 percent per
annum in real value. These economic
gains have been highly uneven, especial-
ly between the country’s urban/com-
mercial minority and the rural/agricul-
tural majority, but it is clear nonetheless
that the bulk of the country’s population
has enjoyed a signi½cant improvement
in living standards. If the improvement
in living standards for the majority of
the population is the circumstance un-
der which a society normally makes
progress on social and political dimen-
sions as well, then it is likely that over
time China, too, will evolve in the direc-
tion of democracy if the country is able
to maintain its current rate of economic
advance.
If this conclusion seems optimistic,
that is because it is. The notion of a caus-
al connection between advances in ma-
terial well-being and in the social/polit-
ical/moral character of a society stems
from an Enlightenment tradition that
from its origins was grounded in, and
drew strength from, a robustly optimis-
tic perspective on the human enterprise.
Economics, which originally grew out 
of this same tradition, took a different
course during the nineteenth century
and became the ‘dismal science.’ But by
now experience has solidly discon½rmed
the fears of Malthus and Mill (and Marx,
too), and there is no reason why econo-
mics should not reclaim the essential
human optimism that was its intellec-
tual birthright.
T he connection between rising living
standards and either social attitudes or
political institutions is not limited to
low-income countries, or to the mere
establishment of new electoral institu-
tions. In America, for example, eras in
which economic expansion has deliv-
ered ongoing material bene½ts to the
majority of the country’s population
have mostly corresponded to eras when
opportunities and freedoms have broad-
ened, political institutions have become
more democratic, and the treatment 
of society’s unfortunates has become
more generous. But when incomes have
stagnated or declined, reaction and re-
treat have been the order of the day. (A
major exception was the 1930s, when 
the Depression instead led to a signi½-
cant opening of American society and
strengthening of American democracy,
perhaps because the economic distress
was so severe and so widespread that 
the sense of being in the same sinking
ship together overwhelmed the more
competitive instincts that usually pre-
vail when people realize they are not 
getting ahead.)
Attitudes toward immigrants are a
useful case in point: The United States
experienced a wave of anti-immigrant
violence in the 1850s, which largely dis-
appeared during the robust industrial
expansion after the Civil War. The long
agricultural depression of the 1880s and
1890s saw a return of extremely ugly
anti-immigrant agitation and prejudice.
That movement gave way, after the turn
of the twentieth century when econom-
ic growth returned, to a period in which
the mood of the country was to welcome
–in the language of the time, to ‘Ameri-
canize’–large numbers of immigrants.But the pair of economic downturns that
followed World War I then led to the
highly restrictive and plainly discrimina-
tory Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and
National Origins Act of 1924. (The ½rst
half of the 1920s was also when the Ku
Klux Klan achieved its greatest influence
in American society and politics, and 
not just in the South, or only in rural
areas, but also in states like Michigan
and Pennsylvania and in cities like Chi-
cago and Indianapolis.) 
Wholesale immigration reform fol-
lowed only in 1965, in the middle of the
longest sustained economic expansion
in U.S. history. As incomes stagnated in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
a backlash developed, which included
such manifestations as Proposition 187
in California and efforts in states like
Florida and Texas to deny public bene½ts
even to legal immigrants. But with the
strong economic expansion of the mid-
to-late 1990s, the issue disappeared to
such an extent that the one candidate
who chose to run for president in 2000
on an explicitly anti-immigrant platform
(Pat Buchanan) attracted so few votes,
even in the Republican primaries, that
he had to change parties. Today, follow-
ing the return of stagnating incomes
since 2000, immigration is again a high-
ly contentious issue.
It would be foolish to pretend that
every twist in this century and a half of
American attitudes and policies toward
immigrants was narrowly or determinis-
tically driven by the simple difference
between improving and stagnating liv-
ing standards. But it would be even more
foolish to pretend that the underlying
ebb and flow of economic prosperity
and stagnation had nothing to do with
what happened. And on other issues as
well, such as race relations, religious tol-
eration, generosity to the poor–in addi-
tion to such basics as who gets to vote
and under what circumstances–the his-
torical record likewise makes clear that
democracy more often advances when
living standards are advancing, too. One
can only speculate what American de-
mocracy would look like today if, per-
haps as a reaction to the Depression, the
country had abandoned its largely mar-
ket-oriented economic system in favor
of Soviet-style central planning, and the
fourfold increase in per-capita income
that has taken place (compared to the
pre-Depression peak) had not occurred.
America is not the only long-estab-
lished Western democracy where a con-
nection between rising living standards
and the strengthening of democratic
freedoms is evident. In Britain the open-
ing of the universities, the civil service,
and other areas of society to non-An-
glicans in the 1870s; the institution of
many forms of basic economic protec-
tion in the 1940s, as recommended by
the wartime Beveridge Report; and the
reform of British race relations in the
1960s all occurred during times of robust
economic expansion and widely shared
improvement in living standards. In
France the same was true for the broad
reforms in civil liberties, in electoral in-
stitutions, and in education during the
early years of the Third Republic, and 
for the parallel set of reforms introduced
by de Gaulle after World War II. In Ger-
many the legal and judicial reforms that
followed the uni½cation of the German
empire in 1871, the creation of the Fed-
eral Republic as a postwar democratic
state, and Willy Brandt’s dramatic chal-
lenge to “dare more democracy” like-
wise all occurred in the context of ro-
bust, sustained, widely shared increases
in incomes.
Conversely, many of the horrifying
antidemocratic phenomena that so
marred Europe’s twentieth-century 
history ensued in a setting of pervasive
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economic stagnation or decline. Hitler’s
rise to power in the wake of economic
and political chaos under the Weimar
Republic is a familiar story, but it is
worth recalling that as late as 1928 the
Nazi Party drew only 2.8 percent of the
vote in German national elections. What
made the difference, soon thereafter,
was the onset of the Depression, which
affected Germany more than any other
European country. Similarly, France’s
Vichy regime, which willingly collabo-
rated with the authorities in German-
occupied areas of the country (France
was one of only two European countries,
along with Bulgaria, to turn Jews over 
to the Nazis from territory the Germans
did not occupy), emerged out of a pro-
tracted period of French economic stag-
nation.
In these other countries as well, one
can easily point to signi½cant historical
events that contradict the tendency for
social and political progress to follow
economic progress (though probably
none so obvious, or so important, as the
1930s in America). Bismarck’s pioneer-
ing introduction of social insurance in
Germany in the 1880s, the Asquith re-
forms in Britain before World War I, and
the ambitious agenda of the Matignon
Accords in France in the 1930s are all
noticeable counterexamples. But what 
is at issue here is not the laws of physics,
which are plausibly true ‘everywhere
and always,’ but rather the kind of pre-
dominant tendency that signi½es rela-
tionships that emerge in the study of
human behavior, both at the individu-
al level and especially in the aggregate.
Viewed through that lens, the historical
record is clear enough.
Such relationships, of course, need not
be one-sided. The idea that rising living
standards foster democratic freedoms
and institutions need not preclude the
parallel notion that these features of so-
ciety enhance the ability of any econo-
my, but especially one based primarily
on private initiative and decentralized
markets, to achieve superior perform-
ance over time. At the most basic level, 
it is obvious that either formal or infor-
mal restrictions barring half of the pop-
ulation from certain jobs because they
are of the ‘wrong’ sex, and one-sixth of
the remainder because their skin is the
‘wrong’ color, interfere with a society’s
ability to make the most ef½cient use of
its labor resources. Failing to educate
and train large numbers of children in 
a way that adequately equips them for
postindustrial employment, in most
cases simply because their parents have
failed to earn middle-class incomes, pre-
sents a similar impediment.
Other elements of what democracy
normally entails may also plausibly en-
hance an economy’s ability to thrive 
and to grow, although in many cases nei-
ther the argument nor the evidence is
straightforward. Dictatorships may or
may not be benevolent, while electoral
democracies likewise often exhibit their
own forms of corruption and cronyism
–especially when, as in practically all
democratic countries today, the govern-
ment plays a signi½cant role in regulat-
ing economic activity. Wasted resources
and unproductive investment interfere
with economic ef½ciency and constrain
economic growth regardless of whether
the favored party is a dictator’s relative
or a campaign contributor to a political
party.
Not surprisingly, economists–who are
normally more interested in explaining
economic phenomena than in exploring
their consequences–have devoted sub-
stantial effort to investigating the role of
different political institutions, and dif-
ferent legal frameworks, in accounting
for why some countries enjoy more eco-nomic success than others. Leaving aside
the obvious exceptions, like China and
countries where income from oil exports
has risen rapidly at times of tight world
energy markets, there is some tendency
for electoral democracies to perform
better economically, although even with
these exceptions excluded the relation-
ship is hardly close. Indeed, some evi-
dence suggests that while moving from
minimal civil liberties and political
rights to something more like the world
average is helpful in this regard, ‘too
much’ democracy exerts a negative in-
fluence on an economy’s growth (per-
haps because of more redistributive tax-
ation, or excessive litigation and regula-
tion). Even more so than electoral insti-
tutions per se, the evidence indicates
that effective ‘rule of law,’ especially the
protection of property rights, matters 
for economic growth.
As a result, societies may ½nd them-
selves stuck in either a virtuous circle in
which economic growth and democratic
freedoms mutually reinforce one anoth-
er or, less fortunately, a vicious circle in
which the stagnation of living standards
blunts any movement toward democrat-
ic reform while adverse political institu-
tions and the absence of basic freedoms
retard economic improvement for most
citizens. Leaving aside the episodic char-
acter of market-driven economic growth
in most Western societies, the long-term
experience of countries like the United
States is a rough example of the former.
The current plight of many countries in
sub-Saharan Africa presents even sharp-
er examples of the latter.
But in either case, the relationships 
at work also bear on the more funda-
mental question of how market-orient-
ed economic organization and democ-
racy are connected. The rule of law 
and protection of the rights of credi-
tors and other property-holders, for ex-
ample, are clearly essential to any eco-
nomic system based on markets and on
private initiative and incentive. On the
available evidence, these institutions
also appear–perhaps for just that rea-
son–to be signi½cant contributors to
economic growth. Hence at least some
elements of what is normally meant by
democracy are not just consequences of
rising living standards but also key pre-
conditions to the form of economic or-
ganization that makes sustained increas-
es in living standards possible.
Free markets are not without their limi-
tations, of course, and prominent among
them in the context of democracy and its
broader implications is the absence of
any moral principle governing the distri-
bution of what the economy produces.
Until fairly recently, most economists,
following the thinking of Simon Kuznets
half a century ago, believed that while
incomes would become more unequal
for some time in the early stages of a
country’s economic development, in due
course that process would reverse and a
narrowing of inequality would accom-
pany further increases in the average in-
come. The more recent record has belied
this theory. Income inequality in Amer-
ica, for example, has been increasing
again since the late 1960s. The share of
the nation’s income accruing to the top
½fth of all households has risen from
42.6 percent in 1968 to 50.4 percent in
2005 (the latest data available), while the
share received by each of the other four
½fths has correspondingly fallen. Most
other industrialized countries have had
similar experiences.
To be sure, there is no lack of plausi-
ble explanations for this phenomenon,
some of them consistent with the ideas
underlying Kuznets’s original thinking.
Most economists agree that the prima-
ry force widening the distribution of in-
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comes in recent decades has been a tech-
nological revolution that has sharply in-
creased the demand for some kinds of
skills while reducing the demand for
others. As a result, workers who happen
to have those newly scarce skills (com-
puter programming, for example, or fa-
cility with certain forms of organization-
al management) have been able to com-
mand high premiums in the labor mar-
ket, while those whose skills are in les-
ser demand (more basic industrial disci-
plines, or even brute-force manpower)
have seen their wages decline and jobs
become harder to ½nd. The difference
from what Kuznets thought is that in-
stead of occurring just once, at the be-
ginning of a country’s economic devel-
opment, this kind of massive shift in the
demand for different kinds of skills in
the workforce can recur whenever an
economy undergoes a technological rev-
olution. As a result, the distribution of
incomes need not simply widen once
and then contract inde½nitely thereaf-
ter, but rather can undergo repeated epi-
sodes of widening inequality depending
on the course of technological innova-
tion.
Importantly, however, Kuznets and
other economic historians (most promi-
nently Jeffrey Williamson) posited that
the subsequent narrowing of inequali-
ties, once the technological basis of pro-
duction has stabilized, is also the result
of systematic economic forces. On the
demand side, larger wage premiums 
for workers with certain skills lead busi-
ness to innovate in yet further ways, so
as to economize on the use of what has
now become high-wage labor. At the
same time, the larger wage premiums
give workers an increased incentive to
acquire the skills that are scarce, there-
by introducing a supply response as 
well. And since in most countries the
education of young people who are yet
to enter the labor force is primarily the
responsibility of the public sector, the
government likewise can respond to the
incentive to impart those skills that the
labor market now values more highly.
Over time, therefore, the widening of
inequality brought on by technologi-
cal revolutions in countries that are far
along the path of economic develop-
ment is also likely to turn around.
But this process may be a lengthy one,
as the experience of the United States
and other industrialized countries in
recent decades suggests, and along the
way the wider inequality remains a fact
with which the society must deal. If the
overall growth rate is suf½cient, as it has
been in China, incomes may become
sharply more unequal and yet most citi-
zens will enjoy improving living stan-
dards. But when aggregate growth is
more modest, as is likely to be the case
where the economy is already highly
industrialized, a suf½cient widening in
the distribution of incomes means that
many if not most citizens will fail to en-
joy an improvement in their living stan-
dards.
The implications, from the perspec-
tive of what connects market-oriented
economies to democratic societies, are
sobering. If part of what matters for tol-
erance and fairness and opportunity, 
not to mention the strength of a soci-
ety’s democratic political institutions, 
is that the broad cross-section of the
population has a con½dent sense of get-
ting ahead economically, then no socie-
ty–no matter how rich it becomes or
how well-formed its institutions may be
–is immune from seeing its basic dem-
ocratic values at risk whenever the ma-
jority of its citizens lose their sense of
economic progress.
Since the widening of the American
income distribution began in the late
1960s, and especially since the onset of the economic pressures that ½rst
emerged when the opeccartel quadru-
pled oil prices in 1973, overall economic
growth in the United States has failed to
offset the effect of ever-wider inequali-
ties in retarding the economic advance
of most Americans. Between 1973 and
1993 the economy’s average growth rate,
after correcting for rising prices, was 2.8
percent per annum. After allowing also
for population growth, the increase in
per-capita income averaged 1.7 percent.
But because so much of the fruits of that
economic growth went to a fairly small
group at the top, the increase in the me-
dian income–that is, the income of the
family just at the middle of the country’s
income distribution–averaged only 0.3
percent.
With faster overall growth, and some
slowing in the widening of the income
distribution, the median American fam-
ily income rose at a much healthier pace
during the remainder of the 1990s: on
average, 2.3 percent per annum faster
than inflation. Since then, however, 
the patterns of the prior two decades
have again been dominant. From 2000
through 2006, the economy overall ex-
panded on average at 2.5 percent per an-
num. But at least through 2005 (again,
the latest data available), the median
family income has declined, compared 
to inflation, by 0.5 percent per annum.
Indeed, the median family income has
declined, in real terms, in four of the
past ½ve years. 
Five years is not a very long time from
the perspective of basic influences on
human behavior, and therefore on the
advance or retreat of democratic society.
But on the current trajectory of modest
overall growth and widening inequality,
the stagnation of incomes for a signi½-
cant proportion of American families
may plausibly continue for some years to
come. Further, except for a more favor-
able interlude in the mid-to-late 1990s,
what is happening now is mostly a con-
tinuation of patterns that have been in
place for the past three decades. If these
trends persist, many of the social and
political pathologies that have emerged
in the past, both here and elsewhere, are
likely to reappear.
As the Kuznets-Williamson line of
thinking suggests, all this may well turn
around once the pace of technological
innovation slows. The larger question 
is whether that slowing in the adoption
of new technology (more speci½cally, in
the demands that new technology places
on the skill base of the workforce) will
occur. What if the characteristic feature
of economic production and organiza-
tion in the postindustrial age turns out
to be an accelerated pace of ongoing
technological change? Would the dy-
namic responses governing the supply 
of economic skills, including responses
to individual incentives as well as poli-
cies implemented by government, be
able to keep up? These questions loom
as the greatest uncertainties threatening
the link between the market-oriented
economy and political democracy in the
years ahead.
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